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STATE OF UTAH 
WASH-A-MATIC, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIS RUPP, a/k/a WILLIE RUPP, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to review a Judicial Decision of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, presiding, dismissing an 
action brought by the Appellant for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a complaint in the lower court seek-
ing damages for breach of a contract entered into between 
the parties. The issues were tried to the Court sitting 
without a jury and thereafter, Findings of Fact, Conclu-
Case No. 
13688 
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sions of Law and Judgment were entered holding that 
there was no binding contract between the parties, that 
Appellant was not, therefore, entitled to an award of 
damages, and that Respondent was entitled to a judg-
ment of dismissal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court dismissing Appellant's complaint and pur-
suant thereto directing entry of judgment in favor of the 
Appellant for $12,136,70 in accordance with Appellant's 
prayer for relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during the Spring of 1971 a Mr. Pitcock 
contacted Bert Nelson, a service representative for Nel-
son Service and said that a friend, Willis Rupp, was in-
terested in a car wash installation (R. 60, 65, 70, 71). 
Shortly thereafter Nelson personally contacted Rupp and 
discussed with him the size and type of the possible oar 
wash installation (R. 60). Nelson then contacted Jack 
Thurmond, President of Wash-A-Matic, the local dis-
tributor for car wash equipment manufactured by Liv-
ingston Industries, Inc. (hereinaftter "Livingston") (R. 
61). Wash-A-Matic indicated its interest in this instal-
lation and a meeting was subsequently held between Nel-
son, Thurmond and Rupp at Rupp's office. The possible 
locations, size of and financing of the prospective car 
wash was discussed (R. 63, 65, 71). Rupp, Nelson, and 
Thurmond also personally viewed two alternative sites 
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for installation of the car wash with the preferred loca-
tion being at Rupp's office at 4500 South and Redwood 
Road in Salt Lake County (R. 72). Rupp also assured 
them that the proper zoning for installation of a car wash 
would be no problem (R. 63, 72). 
At a second meeting between the same individuals, 
two leasing firms, Capital Goods and Leasing and Equip-
ment Leasing of California, (hereinafter "Equipment 
Leasing") were specifically discussed as a possible meth-
od of financing. It was agreed that the equipment was 
to be purchased from Livingston, the manufacturer, and 
Rupp also expressed the desire that the equipment be 
installed by the fall of 1971 (R. 73). During the summer 
of 1971 in either the month of June or July, Ted Martin, 
a representative of Equipment Leasing, visited Salt Lake 
(R. 74). While in Salt Lake Martin met with Thurmond, 
Douglas J. Davis (the vice-president of Wash-A-Matic) 
and Rupp in Rupp's office. Possible sites for construc-
tion of the car wash were viewed and Mr. Rupp again 
assured aU present that zoning was no problem (R. 75). 
On August 5th, Thurmond and Rupp met again in 
Rupp's office. Rupp indicated that he wanted to get the 
car wash in by fall. Thurmond responded that a signed 
order would have to be executed with a deposit of $200.00 
before the equipment could be ordered (R. 76, 143, 144). 
Pursuant thereto, Exhibit 1-P was duly executed and 
the deposit paid (R. 76). 
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Alternative forms of financing were discussed, in-
cluding bank financing, leasing and a cash purchase from 
Rupp's own funds (R. 74, 80, 153). Rupp was at that 
time negotiating with Capital Goods and Leasing and 
Exhibit 2-P showing an installed price for the equipment 
was prepared by Wash-A-Matic and sent to Capital to 
aid in such negotiations (R. 78, 79). Capital subsequently 
rejected the lease (R. 79). As soon as he learned of the 
Capital Goods and Leasing rejection, Thurmond con-
tacted Rupp and asked if he wanted to go with Equip-
ment Leasing (R. 80). Rupp agreed and within a week, 
Rupp met with Thurmond and Davis at the offices of 
Wash-A-Matic (R. 80). A conference telephone call was 
placed to Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing. Martin 
discussed the information and documents that would be 
necessary to obtain Rupp's credit approval (R. 81, 82). 
Rupp subsequently supplied the necessary information 
and documents (R. 82). 
Within a short time after completion of the documen-
tation, Thurmond received a call from Martin informing 
him that Rupp's credit had been cleared and that the 
financing was set (R, 82, 87,115 and Depo. of Ted Martin 
at p. 8). Immediately thereafter Thurmond called Rupp 
and stated that financing had been approved and that the 
papers for Rupp's signature would be forthcoming. Upon 
hearing that his credit had been cleared, Rupp was elated, 
and stated "Let's get the equipment out here and get it 
going, get it installed" (R. 87). Based upon Rupp's re-
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quest, Thurmond placed a call to Livingston and re-
quested that they expedite the contract and ship the 
equipment. 
Equipment Leasing needed a purchase order from 
Wash-A-Matic to complete the paper work on the lease. 
After discussing whether Rupp wanted the lease to cover 
only the equipment price or include an installed price 
Rupp elected the complete installation package (R. 89). 
Exhibit 3-P reflecting that price was prepared at Rupp's 
office sometime during the forepart of October, 1971, and 
was sent to Equipment Leasing (R. 93). 
At or about that same time, the equipment arrived 
in Salt Lake, having been shipped directly to Rupp (R. 
94). The first shipment consisted of some fasteners and 
a sign which Rupp accepted (R. 142). Wash-A-Matic re-
ceived notice that the equipment had in fact been shipped 
through an invoice from Livingston showing the date 
of shipment and the cost of the equipment (Ex. 4-P and 
R. 94, 95). A few days after receipt of the invoice, Thur-
mond received a call from Livingston indicating that Rupp 
had refused acceptance of all but the first small shipment 
of the equipment (R. 96). Upon learning of this refusal, 
Thurmond contacted IML Trucklines who verified that 
the equipment was still on the dock (R. 96). Thurmond 
then called Rupp. For the first time in some six months 
since represenatives of Wash-A-Matic first contacted 
Rupp he indicated that he had a zoning problem on his 
property which prevented him from installing the equip-
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ment.1 Nonetheless, he indicated that he was sure the 
problem could be worked out and that the equipment 
should be held here (R. 96). 
Over the next several months Rupp apparently tried 
to resolve the zoning problem which he had enooimtered. 
By letter dated January 7, 1972 Rupp advised Equipment 
Leasing of his zoning problems and thanked them again 
for holding the commitment of funds for the purchase 
and lease of the equipment (Ex. 9-P). Equipment Leas-
ing, concerned that the equipment had never been in-
stalled and the lease closed, wrote a letter to Rupp dated 
January 14, 1972 requesting that Rupp supply Equip-
ment Leasing with a $1,000.00 deposit to "tie up the 
money that we have arranged for you until you get your 
land problems solved" (Ex. 8-P). Equipment Leasing 
had obtained a commitment from the Chase Manhattan 
Bank of New York City to supply the funds for the pur-
chase of the equipment by Equipment Leasing (Dep. of 
Mr. Martin, at pp. 8, 9 and Ex. 10-P). As of the January 
14, 1972 letter, the only thing Rupp had to do to retain 
the commitment of funds until such time as he had re-
solved his zoning problem was supply Equipment Leas-
1
 Although the parties consistently referred to Rupp's problem as 
zoning, it was not in fact a question of appropriate zoning. Rather, 
Salt Lake County refused to issue Rupp a building permit, unless 
Rupp donated to Salt Lake County a 10 foot wide strip of ground 
for the purpose of widening 4500 South (R. 154). Rupp refused to 
donate the strip and was thus unable to make the car wash installa-
tion at the 4500 South site. It should be pointed out, however, that 
Rupp represented that alternative sites were available and that if 
the installation could not be made at the 4500 South site, he would 
install the car wash elsewhere (R. 72). 
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ing with the $1,000 deposit (Depo. of Mr. Martin, 
p. 9 and R. 141, 142, Ex. 8-P). The deposit was never 
sent (R. 141, 142). Even then, however, Equipment 
Leasing sent no termination notice to Rupp and the nego-
tiations continued. 
As a result of Rupp's request to hold the equipment 
here, the equipment was stored either at IML or in a 
warehouse until approximately July of 1972 at a cost of 
$200.00. The storage charges were paid by Livingston 
and rebilled to Wash-A-Matic (R. 99 and Ex. 7-P). In 
July or August of 1972, nearly a full year after Rupp had 
ordered the equipment, Thurmond and Rupp had a tele-
phone conversation wherein Rupp stated he no longer 
wanted the equipment that had been shipped and stored 
at his express request nearly 10 months previous (R. 99-
100). 
Wash-A-Matic attempted to sell the equipment with-
out success since it was specially manufactured and too 
large for any other than available locations (R. 100). As 
a result, the equipment was shipped back to Kansas City 
to the manufacturer (R. 100). 
Inasmuch as the equipment was refused, Livingston 
Industries paid the freight charges both to and from Salt 
Lake City and rebilled Wash-A-Matic for those charges 
as part of their regular monthly statements (R. 102 and 
Ex. 5-P and 6-P). Introduction of the actual invoices 
was objected to by counsel for Rupp and the court re-
served ruling thereon until the end of trial. In light of 
the court's ruling that financing had not been obtained 
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as required by the contract, the issue of admissibility of 
the damage exhibits became moot and was not resolved 
by the court. The same was true of Exhibit 7-P, the in-
voices of Livingston to Appellant with respect to the 
storage charges for storing the equipment while in Salt 
Lake City. 
It is important to note that at no time during the 
stormy 18 month history of this off-again on-again con-
tract, did Rupp complain about or question financing. 
In fact, Rupp expressly admitted that financing was no 
problem since he could have arranged for this financing 
himself if Equipment Leasing had not (R. 153). Rupp 
acknowledged that it was not a lack of financing but the 
problem of zoning, which was not a condition of the con-
tract, which led to his ultimate rejection of the equip-
ment (R. 154). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S C O N C L U S I O N 
THAT THERE WAS NO BINDING CON-
TRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE CLAUSE "SUB-
JECT TO FINANCING" HAD NOT BEEN 
FULFILLED, IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
On or about August 5, 1971, Appellant and Respon-
dent entered into a sales agreement wherein Respondent 
agreed to purchase and Appellant agreed to sell certain 
car wash equipment for a stated price of $25,785.01. Upon 
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execution of the agreement, Respondent paid a $200.00 
deposit, receipt of which was acknowledged by Appellant 
(Ex. 1-P). Under the section entitled "Special Instruc-
tions" the agreement was made "subject to financing" 
and Appellant agreed to refund the deposit "if financing 
not arranged." 
The conclusion of the lower court, holding that the 
clause "subject to financing" was not satisfied is clearly 
erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. In fact, the 
record shows quite the contrary — that financing was 
made available, that there was a binding contract and 
that Appellant is entitled to damages for the breach 
thereof. 
The purpose and intent of the term "subject to fi-
nancing" is made clear by examination of the provisions 
on the reverse side of the agreement which provide in 
part: 
If other than a cash sale, this contract is subject 
to acceptance by the seller after approval of 
purchaser's credit by finance factor at its home 
office. Acknowledgment to the purchaser by 
letter of acceptable credit by the finance factor 
shall be deemed acceptance by the seller. 
The contract is contingent upon the availability 
to the purchaser of financing as set forth on the 
front of this contract. Upon approval of pur-
chaser's credit, purchaser will execute such forms 
and papers as are required by the finance factor 
as evidence of indebtedness and the security 
therefor, and furnish co-makers and guarantors 
if required. [Emphasis added.] 
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It doesn't take a seer stone to decipher what was 
intended by the condition "subject to financing". It 
wasn't necessary that Respondent have a completed loan 
with money in hand. "Subject to financing" meant sub-
ject to "credit approval". In other words, financing in 
the context used herein means loan commitment. 
This is certainly neither a strained nor unique con-
struction of the term. The home building industry, for 
example, has operated for years on this very system. A 
prospective purchaser enters into an earnest money agree-
ment with a contractor for the purchase of a new home 
to be constructed by the contractor. The earnest money 
agreement is, of course, subject to buyer's financing. The 
buyer then obtains credit approval for a loan covering 
the purchase price from a local lending institution. The 
lending institution so advises the contractor and con-
struction is commenced. Upon completion of the home 
and occupancy by the buyer, the loan is closed, the docu-
ments signed and the funds disbursed. At what point 
does the earnest money agreement become a binding 
contract? Could the buyer walk away at any time prior 
to the actual completion of construction and closing of 
the loan without any liability to the contractor, claiming 
that the earnest money agreement was not binding be-
cause he had not yet been financed? The absurdity of 
such a contention is obvious, and yet that is precisely 
how the lower court defined "subject to financing" in the 
instant case. 
That the lower court's interpretation of the clause 
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"subject to financing" was erroneous is further bolstered 
by the decision in Wilson v. Gray, 102 Cal. App. 2d 63, 
226 P. 2d 726 (1951). There the defendant entered into 
an agreement with plaintiff giving plaintiff the exclusive 
option to secure for defendant a sum of money needed 
to purchase certain timber lands. Plaintiff was unable 
to secure the necessary funds within the option period 
and a second agreement was then worked out. Plaintiff 
would continue his efforts to "secure the necessary fi-
nancing" and if he did so before defendant was able to 
secure the said financing from other sources, then the 
original agreement would be reinstated and plaintiff 
would be entitled to his fee. Defendant obtained a loan 
commitment on August 18. Plaintiff obtained the neces-
sary funds on August 19. The loan commitment obtained 
by defendant did not actually result in an escrow of funds 
until August 20 and the documents were not prepared 
or the loan closed until September 4, more than two 
weeks after plaintiff had obtained the funds. Plaintiff 
claimed that be had obtained the necessary financing 
first and demanded payment of his fee. Defendant re-
fused and plaintiff filed action. 
On appeal from the lower court's decision in favor 
of defendant, the court summarized plaintiff's contention 
at 226 P. 2d 727-28 as follows: 
Appellant further contends that mere nego-
tiation of a loan resulting in the purchase of the 
property by defendants, as found by the trial 
court, was not sufficient to terminate Appel-
lant's rights under the agreement but that an 
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actual completion of the loan was necessary in 
order to cancel his rights. 
In rejecting that contention and affirming the lower 
court's decision, the Appellate Court said at 226 P. 2d 
728: 
We are convinced that a reasonable construction 
of the words "secure the necessary financing" 
when read in the light of the entire agreement 
between the parties, cannot be construed to re-
quire more than an agreement on the part of a 
prospective creditor to make the loan contem-
plated. To interpret the words so used as Appel-
lant would have use do would only lead to more 
confusion. Where one construction would make 
a contract unreasonable or unfair, and another 
construction, equally consistent with the lan-
guage, would make it reasonable, fair and just, 
the latter construction is the one that must be 
adopted. [Emphasis as in original.] 
The record in the instant case is uncontradicted that 
Respondent had obtained "credit approval" and that the 
finance factor, Equipment Leasing, had agreed to provide 
the necessary funds for the purchase of the car wash 
equipment. 
Respondent by his own choice sought to finance 
purchase of the car wash equipment through a leasing 
arrangement with Equipment Leasing (R. 79-80). Re-
spondent, in compliance with the request of Equipment 
Leasing, supplied them with a variety of information and 
documents pertaining to Respondent's credit approval 
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(R. 82). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ted Marin of Equip-
ment Leasing advised both Jack Thurmond, the Presi-
dent of Appellant, and Respondent, that Respondent's 
credit had been approved (R. 82 and Depo. of Ted Mar-
tin, p. 8). In a letter dater January 7, 1972, from Re-
spondent to Mr. Martin, Respondent apologized for the 
extended delay in closing the lease transaction as a result 
of some zoning problems and then acknowledged the 
agreement of Equipment Leasing to provide financing in 
the following words: 
We are sorry for the delay, and greatly ap-
preciate your holding this financing available 
for us. 
(Ex. 9-P). Approximately a week later, in a letter dated 
January 14, 1972 from Mr. Martin to Respondent, Mr. 
Martin reaffirmed the commitment of Equipment Leas-
ing to provide the necessary funding and requested a 
$1,000.00 deposit from Respondent in order to extend 
the commitment (Ex. 8-P). 
Admittedly, at that point no funds had changed 
hands and could not until the appropriate lease docu-
ments were prepared and executed. Again, admittedly, 
such documents were never executed and the funds were 
never disbursed. But that simply is not the issue. 
Whether the lease was signed or even prepared is im-
material! Only two questions need be asked and their 
answers are clear. Had Respondent received credit ap-
proval? Yes. Had Equipment Leasing agreed to supply 
the necessary funds? Yes. To say that Equipment Leas-
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dent's execution of the necessary lease documents is to 
say nothing more than the obvious. That was equally 
true in Wilson v. Gray, supra, but that did not detract 
from the validity of the agreement to supply financing. 
This is equally true in every credit transaction involving 
a loan commitment. Nevertheless, reasonable men justi-
fiably rely upon that commitment and proceed to mater-
ially and unalterably change their positions in reliance 
thereon. That is all that was contemplated by the term 
"subject to financing" in the instant sales contract and 
as soon as Respondent had obtained credit approval and 
the agreement of Equipment Leasing to supply the neces-
sary funds, financing, within the meaning of the sales 
contract, was secured and the contract was binding. 
Conditions precedent, such as that involved here, 
must be looked at fairly in the context in which they are 
used and in which they are intended to operate. As noted 
in the case of Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. Carter Oil 
Co., 31 Wyo. 314, 226 P. 193 (1924), the court in dis-
cussing the effect of conditions precedent in a contract 
stated at 226 P. 198: 
These cases illustrate the proposition that, 
in the absence of a specific provision in the con-
tract showing a contrary intention, the law con-
siders a condition fully performed when the pur-
pose evinced by the contract can be said to have 
been fairly carried out. 
That the condition "subject to financing" has in the in-
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stant case been "fairly carried out" is evidenced by the 
testimony of the defendant on cross examinaition in regard 
to the matter of financing: 
Q. It was the building permit that was 
holding you up, wasn't it? 
A. That and the dedication of the ground. 
Q. You weren't really concerned, were you, 
Mr. Rupp, about financing at that point. It was 
building permit and zoning that was causing 
you problems, wasn't it? 
A. That, and I wanted to see what I was 
going to pay for, which I hadn't ever been ex-
posed to. 
Q. But you had no concern, did you at 
that time, that the money was there available 
for you and that the financing had been arranged 
if you wanted to take advantage of it? 
A. I don't think it was ever brought up. 
Financing was — has never been too much of a 
problem. 
Q. For you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You always felt you could get it fi-
nanced, didn't you? 
A. We probably could have if this had 
failed but we never pursued anything. 
Q. So it was really a problem of building 
permit, wasn't it, Mr. Rupp? 
A. It was a large obstacle. 
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MR. DAVIES: I don't have any further 
questions. 
(R. 154.) 
The decision of the lower court holding that such 
condition had not been met is clearly erroneous and must 
be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE "SUBJECT TO FINANCING" CLAUSE 
WAS EITHER WAIVED OR EXCUSED BY 
REASON OF THE STATEMENTS AND 
CONDUCT OF THE RESPONDENT. 
A. The "Subject to Financing" Clause was Waived. 
The evidence is conclusive that the Respondent's 
desire to have the car wash operational before Fall of 
1971 caused the Appellant to notify Livingston to begin 
manufacture of the goods. Respondent was insistent 
that the equipment was to be installed by the Fall of 
1971 (R. 73). On cross examination he reluctantly ad-
mitted that he told Mr. Thurmond, the President of 
Appellant, of his desire to have the equipment installed: 
Q. Had you ever talked about that with 
Mr. Thurmond. 
A. Of the itme element? 
Q. Of the need to get the equipment or-
dered so we would have — you would have it 
here and installed by the fall. 
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A. Probably did. 
(R. 143-44.) 
Whatever the reason behind Respondent's desire to 
have the car wash operational by Fall of 1971, the im-
portant fact is that after Exhibit 1-P was signed the 
equipment was ordered from Livingston at the insistence 
of Respondent. He was not forced or coerced into signing 
the sales contract, and failed to dissent or object when 
the equipment was ordered at his insistence. 
Exhibit 1-P on its face provides "THIS ORDER IS 
SUBJECT TO ACCEPTANCE BY OUR HOME OF-
FICE AND CANNOT BE CANCELLED AFTER 
MANUFACTURE BEGINS." Even if the "subject to 
financing" clause was not fulfilled, (which, as noted in 
Ptoint I, it clearly was), the fact remains that the Re-
spondent ordered the car washing equipment which was 
specially designed and manufactured to fit his property. 
Any notice of the repudiation of the sales contract was 
not received until after the car washing equipment was 
manufactured and shipped to Utah. The Respondent 
in accepting the performance on the part of the Appel-
lant without asserting the condition of financing thus 
waived his right to later assert the condition. Corbin on 
Contracts § 752 at 707 (1952). As stated in 17 Am. Jur. 
2d, Contracts, § 392 at 838: 
The performance of a condition may be waived 
by an action in reliance upon a representation 
that the performance of a condition will not be 
insisted upon; and such a representation may 
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be inferred from customary conduct. The per-
formance of conditions is dispensed with where 
the performance thereof is waived by acceptance 
of performance differing from that required by 
the contract. 
This court has ruled on the question of the waiver 
of a condition precedent in Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah 
465, 229 P. 2d 296 (1951). The case involved an assign-
ment of a debt which was subject to the condition prece-
dent of payment of certain funds. In holding that the 
condition could be waived the court at 229 P. 2d 297 
quoted with approval from 17 C. J. S. Contracts § 491 
as follows: 
[Performance of a condition precedent to 
taking effect of one contract may be waived 
by the acts of the parties in treating the agree-
ment as in effect. 
See also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Electric Smith Construe-
turn Equipment, 4 Wash. App. 695, 483 P. 2d 880 (1971); 
Gilmore v. Hoffman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 313, 266 P. 2d 833 
(1954); Concarmon v. Yewell, 16 Ariz. App. 320, 493 P. 
2d 122 (1972). 
Respondent now claims that the condition precedent 
"subject to financing" was never fulfilled and he is there-
by not bound by the sales agreement. Yet he ordered and 
even encouraged early delivery. He accepted partial de-
livery of the goods when they were shipped to Salt Lake 
(R. 142). As late as January 7, 1972 he related by letter 
to Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing, "We are very 
anxious to get underway with the car wash as soon as 
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possible, and get same in operation" (Ex. 9-P). The in-
ferences to be drawn from such conduct are clear. Re-
spondent was not concerned with financing. He admitted 
it was no obstacle (R. 154). He wanted the equipment 
and he got it. He must not now be excused from the con-
sequences of his own actions. 
B. The "Subject to Financing" Clause was Excused. 
In a letter dated January 19, 1972, Mr. Martin of 
Equipment Leasing requested a One Thousand Dollar 
($1,000) deposit from Respondent which would continue 
to "tie the money up". This was required to hold the 
financing until such time as the Respondent's recently 
revealed land problems were solved. The deposit was to 
be in the office of Equipment Leasing by January 20, 
1972. This money was not sent by the Respondent. The 
plain fact of the matter is that the Respondent was try-
ing to stall the actual payment of funds until he "straight-
ened his land problems out". 
When a contract of sale is subject to the condition 
precedent of the purchaser's obtaining financing the courts 
are unanimous in holding that the purchaser must make 
diligent efforts to obtain financing. In White & Bollard, 
Inc. v. Goodenow, 58 Wash. 2d 180, 361 P. 2d 571 (1961), 
a broker sued for his real estate commission. The seller 
had accepted an offer contingent upon purchaser obtain-
ing satisfactory financing within a period of 90 days from 
date of execution of the agreement. In discussing the 
effect of such requirement the court stated at 361 P. 2d 
575: 
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[T]he promise which he made was, not to secure 
the financing, but to endeavor to do so, and to 
purchase the property if he was successful. In 
agreeing to immediately seek and use his best 
efforts to secure financing, the purchaser prom-
ised to do positive acts. 
In Reese v. Walker, 77 Ohio L. Abs, 583, 151 N. E. 
2d 605 (1958), the plaintiffs were prospective buyers who 
made a written offer to purchase a certain parcel of real 
estate, pursuant to standard form real estate contract 
"contingent upon securing necessary financing". The 
financing arranged by the buyers was unsatisfactory to 
the sellers and the buyers sued for the return of their 
earnest money offer. At 151 N. E. 2d 608, the Court dis-
cussed the obligation of the buyer as follows: 
Of course, buyers must show good faith. They 
cannot defeat the contract by their own fault. 
They must honestly determine what kind of loan 
they need and must make a bona fide effort to 
obtain it. 
Here Respondent not only failed to use and exercise 
diligent effort in obtaining financing, but actually hin-
dered its obtainance. Month after month the payment 
of the deposit was delayed based upon Respondent's rep-
resentations to Equipment Leasing that he was having 
difficulty with the zoning of the land the car washing 
equipment was to be placed upon. If the financing was 
being held up it was not by the Appellant or Equipment 
Leasing. 
When the occurrence of a condition is within the 
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control of one party to a contract, that party is under 
an implied promise to use best efforts to fulfill the con-
dition. The party cannot remain totally aloof and then 
rely on the failure of a condition as an excuse for non-
performance of his contractual obligation. Failure to use 
best efforts excuses the condition. Tyson v. Tyson, 61 
Ariz. 329, 149 P. 2d 674 (1944). The Restatement of 
Contracts, § 295 at 428 clearly states the rules as 
follows: 
/ / a promissor prevents or hinders the occur-
rence of a condition, or the performance of a re-
turn promise, and the condition would have oc-
curred or the performance of the return promise 
been rendered except for such prevention or 
hindrance, the condition is excused, and the ac-
tual or threatened nonperformance of the return 
promise does not discharge the promissofs duty, 
unless 
(a) the prevention or hindrance by the 
promissor is caused or justified by the conduct 
or pecuniary circumstances of the other party; 
or 
(b) the terms of the contract are such that 
the risk of such prevention or hindrance as oc-
curs is assumed by the other party. [Emphasis 
added.] 
If the condition "subject to financing" ran to the 
benefit of Appellant, then it is elementary that Appellant 
could on its own volition waive the condition. Gilmore 
v. Hoffman, 123 Cal. App, 2d 313, 266 P. 2d 833 (1954). 
If the condition "subject to financing" was for the benefit 
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of Respondent, then Respondent was under a duty to 
use diligent efforts in obtaining financing. The record 
is void of any facts indicating that the Respondent was 
refused any documents from the finance factor, Equitable 
Leasing, and by his own conduct, Respondent failed to 
tender a deposit to hold the financing. Such action ex-
cuses the condition. 
C. Oral Contract Absent the Condition. 
Even assuming arguendo that the written sales 
agreement is unenforoeable because of the failure of a 
condition precedent Respondent's actions give rise to an 
enforceable oral contract. Section 70A-2-201 (3) (a) Utah 
Code Annotated (Repl. vol. 1968) provides that an oral 
agreement is nevertheless enforceable even though in 
violation of the statute of frauds if 
the goods are to be specially manufactured for 
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others 
in the ordinary course of the seller's business 
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is re-
ceived and under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, 
has made either a substantial beginning of their 
manufacture or commitments for their pro-
curement . . . . 
Respondent's actions clearly meet each of the statutory 
requisites. The car wash equipment, because of its un-
usual size, had to be specially manufactured for the Re-
spondent (R. 100). Again due to its unusual size, the 
equipment was not suitable for sale to other prospective 
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purchasers even though Appellant attempted without 
success to make a sale of the equipment. Respondent 
ordered the goods, requested their manufacture and de-
livery, accepted partial delivery thereof, and did not give 
any notice of repudiation until some ten months alter 
the equipment had in fact been manufactured and de-
livered to Salt Lake City. Such actions constitute an 
enforceable oral contract without any condition precedent 
concerning financing. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ITS INCI-
DENTAL DAMAGES INCLUDING THE 
AMOUNTS PAID TO LIVINGSTON AS RE-
IMBURSEMENT FOR F R E I G H T AND 
STORAGE CHARGES. 
As a result of the finding of the lower court that the 
sales agreement was unenforceable, the lower court did 
not make any final determination on the issue of dam-
ages and ultimately failed to rule on the admissibility 
of Appellant's damage exhibits, Exhibits 5-P through 7-P. 
This evidence was clearly admissible, however, and Ap-
pellant is entitled to its reasonably incurred incidental 
damages. 
The express language of the sales contract (Ex. 1-P) 
provides that the goods were to be shipped F. 0. B. from 
Kansas City. Respondent refused to accept part of the 
shipment upon its arrival in Salt Lake. After unsuccess-
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ful efforts to sell the car washing equipment were made, 
the equipment was shipped back to the manufacturer in 
Kansas City. Utah Code Annotated, § 70A-2-710 (Repl. 
vol.1968) provides: 
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller in-
clude any commercially reasonable charges, ex-
penses or commissions incurred in stopping de-
livery, in the transportation, care and custody 
of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection 
with the return or resale of the goods or other-
wise resulting from the breach. 
On direct examination, Mr. Thurmond, an officer 
of Appellant, testified as follows in regard to the ship-
ment of the equipment: 
Q. How was the freight handled or to be 
handled on the shipment of this equipment, Mr. 
Thurmond? 
A. The freight was to be handled collect 
and paid by Mr. Rupp. Insomuch as he did not 
accept the entire shipment Livingston ended up 
billing us for the freight out to Salt Lake, and 
they in turn billed us for the storage while it 
was in the warehouse, and they in turn billed 
us for the shipment back to — freight back to 
Kansas City from Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: Do I understand all the 
equipment was returned to — 
MR. DAVIE S: Returned to the manufac-
turer. 
THE WITNESS: To Kansas City. 
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THE COURT: Does the original contract 
mention the word whether that price was F. 0. B. 
manufacture or deliver to Salt Lake or where? 
MR. DAVIES: It indicates F. O. B. Kan-
sas City, Your Honor, if I'm not mistaken. 
THE COURT: All right. I haven't had a 
chance to see it yet. 
(R. 101.) 
Appellant's Exhibits 5-7 are invoices from Living-
ston to Wash-A-Matic for freight and storage costs 
amounting to $4,080.57. When the Respondent failed to 
pay the freight and storage charges, the charges were 
billed to the manufacturer who then billed Appellant. 
The costs were paid by Appellant as indicated by the 
following testimony of Mr. Thurmond: 
Q. (By Mr. Davies) Mr. Thurmond, let 
me show you what has been marked as Exhibit 
5-P and ask you if you can identify that for us, 
please? 
A. Yes, this is the invoice on Mr. Rupp's 
equipment for the freight bills and invoiced to 
Wash-A-Matic. 
Q. From who. 
A. From Livingston to us for the cost of 
getting the equipment out here. 
Q. This is the cost of shipping the equip-
ment to Salt Lake? 
A. This is the cost of shipping the equip-
ment to Salt Lake. 
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THE COURT: What number is that? 
MR. DA VIES: Exhibit 5-P, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Freight charges to Salt 
Lake? 
MR. DAVIES: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Davies) Was that freight bill 
subsequently — excuse me, was Livingston, Inc. 
subsequently reimbursed for the freight cost pur-
suant to that invoice by Wash-A-Matic? 
Q. Yes, that is billed against us and we are 
responsible for it. 
THE COURT: The question was, "Did you 
pay it?" 
THE WITNESS: I pay on a monthly state-
ment, I don't know if there was an actual check 
written out for that amount, no. 
Q. Was this bill then added to your regu-
lar statement. 
A. Billed and added to our regular state-
ment as our invoices. 
Q. And you pay that statement on a mon-
thly basis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me show you now what has been 
marked, Mr. Thurmond, as Exhibit 6-P and ask 
you if you can identify that for us, please? 
A. Yes, this is an invoice also on Mr. Rupp's 
equipment for the return of the equipment to 
the manufacturer, Livingston Industries, at 
which they have invoiced and billed us for and 
put on our statement. 
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Q. And would your answers with reference 
to 6-P concerning payment of that invoice be 
the same as it was for Exhibit 5-P? 
(R. 102.) 
Mr. Thurmond's testimony concerning Exhibit 7-P, 
the invoices for storage charges, was similar (R. 106). 
Appellant's Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 are duplicate origin-
als and are admissible, pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
tated, § 78-25-16 (1953). Respondent admitted the 
documents were received by the Appellant from Living-
ston (R. 106), but argued that they were not admissible, 
on the ground that they were hearsay. On the basis of 
this objection, the lower court reserved ruling on the 
admissibility of the exhibits until the close of trial (R. 
104). The ruling was never forthcoming. 
Rule 63 (13) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Business Entries and the Like. Writings 
offered as memoranda or records of acts, condi-
tions or events to prove the facts stated therein, 
if the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of a business at or about the time 
of the act, condition or event recorded, and that 
the sources of information from which made and 
the method and circumstances of their prepara-
tion were such as to indicate their trustworthi-
ness: 
Invoices have been universally held to be business en-
tries. See Annotations found in 17 A. L. R. 2d 235 and 
83 A. L. R. 806. 
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For example, in Zerbinos v. Lewis, 394 P. 2d 886 
(Alaska, 1964), a driver sued for injuries received when 
his vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by the 
defendant. The plaintiff contended that the trial court 
committed reversible error by admitting into evidence 
two receipts purportedly issued to the defendant for 
money paid to a service station for services rendered on 
her car, including items for brake adjustment and brake 
fluid about two months prior to the accident. The court 
held that on the question of the admissibility of the re-
ceipts that they were not hearsay. 
Similarly, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Wood, 
88 Okla. 95, 212 P. 132 (1923), involved a suit on a bur-
glary insurance policy which required keeping a set of 
books. The court held that original invoices of merchan-
dise purchased were admissible and not considered hear-
say. 
Under the present facts, Mr. Thurmond as president 
of Appellant testified as to the actual amount of inci-
dental damages paid and insurred as a result of the 
breach of contract by the Respondent. Appellant's Ex-
hibits 5-7 are invoices reflecting such expenditures and 
should be admissible as further evidence of the incidental 
damages suffered by Appellant as a result of Respon-
dent's breach of contract. 
POINT IV. 
LOSS OF PROFITS IS A PROPER MEA-
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SURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
Exhibit 4-P as admitted into evidence is the bill and 
invoice from Livingston to the Appellant for the cost of 
the car-washing equipment ordered by the Respondent. 
The amount stated on the face of the invoice is $17,698.88. 
The difference between the contract price of $25,755.01 
as found on Exhibit 1-P and Appellant's cost of $17,-
698.88 is $8,056.13. Under Utah law the amount of $8,-
056.13 is a proper measure of damages for Respondent's 
breach of contract. § 70A-2-708 Utah Code Annotated 
(Repl. vol. 1968). 
As stated in 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 652 at 847-50: 
The Uniform Commercial Code appears to fol-
low the view that a dealer, manufacturer's agent, 
or middleman should have as a measure of dam-
ages his lost profits where the buyer has 
breached. This eliminates the unfair and eco-
nomically wasteful results arising under the ol-
der law when fixed price articles were involved. 
The Uniform Commercial Code permits the re-
covery of lost profits in all appropriate cases, 
which would include all standard priced goods; 
and the normal measure there would be list 
price less cost to the dealer. 
The Respondent is, in addition to the incidental dam-
ages suffered by Appellants, liable for the loss of profits 
of the Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues presented on this appeal are far from 
complicated. The court is faced with a simple and classi-
cal contractual dispute. Two parties entered into a sales 
agreement. The agreement was made subject to the pur-
chaser's obtaining financing. The purchaser, by his own 
choice, sought to finance the purchase of the equipment 
set forth in the agreement through a lease arrangement. 
After submission of the requisite financial informa-
tion by the purchaser to the leasing company, said com-
pany approved the purchaser's credit and both verbally 
and in writing committed the funds necessary to purchase 
the equipment. The equipment, which had to be specially 
manufactured, was ordered and shipped to Salt Lake City. 
The purchaser accepted the first partial shipment and 
requested that the remaining equipment shipped subse-
quently be held in Salt Lake City pending determination 
of certain land problems. 
When the purchaser could not work out his land 
problems to his satisfaction (which land problems were 
in no way a condition precedent to the validity of the 
contract) he unilaterally decided not to go through with 
the purchase, refused delivery of the balance of the 
equipment and refused to pay for the same. As justifica-
tion for this flagrant breach of contract, the purchaser 
now contends that since he had not yet received the lease 
documents for his signature and since no funds had 
changed hands, he was not yet financed and there was no 
binding contract. 
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Reduced to its simplest terms, this appeal asks the 
question: What does the condition "subject to financing" 
in a sales contract mean? Does it require a completed 
financial transaction including preparation and presenta-
tion for execution of all necessary documents or is the 
condition fulfilled when the purchaser's credit is ap-
proved and a loan commitment given? It is submitted 
that both the contract itself, normal awnmercial usage, 
and the relevant case law require acceptance of the latter 
definition. Based thereon, the decision of the lower court 
to the contrary must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. DAVIES 
WALTER J. PLUMB, III 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
